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DISCUSSIONS OF DEEP ECOLOGY, WHILE widespread throughout the en-
vironmental philosophy literature, are often suffused with misconceptions and
misunderstandings. Some of these are relatively trivial, but others, unfortunate-
ly, are quite serious. These more serious errors in interpretation have often re-
sulted in misrepresentation and distortion of the deep ecology approach (DEA).
The purposes of this discussion are to outline several of the misconception-
s, suggest some possible reasons for their prevalence, and offer an alternative,
hopefully clarifying, interpretation of the DEA.
People seem either to feel at home with deep ecology (are sympathetic to the
search for ”root” causes, efforts to articulate one’s total view, Naess and Ses-
sion’s ”deep ecology platform,” etc.) or they tend to feel antipathy towards
it. A situation has emerged where supporters frequently neglect to give deep
ecology a critical eye, while foes often fail to give it a receptive ear.
While some may argue about whether Naess should be considered as the ”fa-
ther” of deep ecology, he is undeniably responsible for the interpretation of deep
ecology that I consider here. A host of expositions and criticisms of deep ecol-
ogy (or elements of it) have been put forth.1 Many of these contain careful and
coherent analyses. Even some of these, however, are hindered by one or more
forms of four weaknesses common to discussions of deep ecology.2 My purpose
in raising these ”weaknesses” is not to criticize particular authors, but rather
to call attention to the dearth of accessible, thorough, and balanced treatments
of Naess’s DEA.
The first weakness consists of building expository discussions upon relatively
unsophisticated reasoning. Examples range from seemingly rote acceptance or
repetition of Naess’s most popular writings to naive, sometimes misleading, por-
trayals of Naess’s ideas. A common instance is the unfortunate use of the term
”deep ecologists” for supporters or theoreticians of the deep ecology movement.
While at first glance this seems like a relatively trivial use of shorthand, it has
significant semantic implications, the most serious of which is that it implicitly
suggests the existence of a counterpart to ”deep ecologists,” namely ”shallow
ecologists.” This is an assertion Naess never intended to make and many times
has counseled against. His use of the depth metaphor, following Kierkegaard,
was directed at our level of problematizing.3 Its purpose is to draw attention
to the need for publicly questioning all of the practices, policies, values, and
assumptions that propel the ecological crisis.
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A second, quite common shortcoming results from drawing inferences from a
scanty, selective, or dated reading of the literature or unmindful subtextual
analyses. The broad range, depth, volume, and evolutionary nature of Naess’s
philosophical writings demand a particularly labor intensive commitment to
comprehensive analysis. Naess’s many unpublished papers and tendency to
revise, revise, and re-revise make this weakness difficult to avoid even with
a commitment to thoroughpaced analysis. Examples of the selective reading
weakness include assertions that deep ecology is inherently anti-humanist or
anti-feminist because the deep ecology platform and the vast majority of deep
ecology writings fail to make explicit reference to the oppression of women and
the general domination of some humans by other humans. The deep ecology
movement has as its primary focus the reversal of the ecological crisis; this
focus in no way precludes or undermines the overlapping concerns of the peace
and social justice movements. The deep ecology approach is consistent with
many possible interpretations of and responses to the roots and origins of the
ecological crisis.
The third, and perhaps most significant weakness, may result from a compound-
ing of the two previous shortcomings, but is not necessarily derivative of them.
It arises from incorporating critical misconceptions and methodological or logi-
cal fallacies. Five examples of misconceptions include: (1) equating ecocentrism
with misanthropy, (2) identifying ”Self-realization!,” the fundamental norm of
Naess’s personal Ecosophy T, or ”biospherical egalitarianism in principle” as
singular fundamental norms of deep ecology, (3) isolating the deep ecology plat-
form (DEP) as the ”heart” of deep ecology or dismissing it as ”non-distinctive”
without considering the gestalt nature of the DEA and its emphasis upon total
views, (4) pinpointing the genealogy of deep ecology in a stoic attempt to over-
come the alienation resulting from the tragic loss of free nature as opposed to a
Pyrrhonian sceptic’s ataraxia,4 questioning of technological optimism, economic
rationality, the costs associated with loss of biodiversity, etc., and concern with
how to live ”rightly,” with virtue and simplicity, and (5) associating Naess’s use
of ”depth” with the level of an individual’s willingness to reject anthropocentris-
m as opposed to raising and taking seriously the search for fundamental causes
and the consideration of radical responses.
Five examples of methodological or logical flaws have included: (1) assuming
that extension of care and concern to non-humans necessarily implies reducing
care for humans, (2) presuming that discussions of population reduction im-
ply draconian measures as opposed to long-term, slow reduction over centuries,
(3) surmising that acceptance of ‘non-instrumental’ or ‘objective’ intrinsic val-
ue5 necessarily implies equal moral standing and treatment for such entities,
(4) inferring that acceptance of intrinsic value necessitates acceptance of moral
monism, and (5) positing that because the DEA identifies with nature as a
gestalt with ‘objective’ intrinsic value and because it sees humanity as a part of
nature that whatever humans do necessarily furthers nature’s interests.
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The final form of weakness is represented by the few disingenuous attempts
at critical analyses that seek to set-up deep ecology as a ”straw man.” These
efforts, which often make use of the previously discussed examples, undertake
to dismiss deep ecology and its contributions by demonstrating that it has fatal
flaws. While some of the other weaknesses are more subtle, and thus insidious,
these undertakings are usually ”hatchet jobs” with transparent ulterior motives.
This brief review of weaknesses associated with the interpretation and expo-
sition of deep ecology highlights the general absence of accessible, thorough,
and balanced treatments of Naess’s DEA.6 One possible explanation for this
scarcity rests in the difficulty of tracing Naess’s own meanings. Following the
zetetic sceptic tradition he eschews dogma by asserting that his own work is
searching, ”on the way;” it is necessarily fragmentary and ever amenable to im-
provements, modifications, and elaborations.7 Naess’s liberal revisions at times,
however, make it truly difficult to pin down his interpretation of particular
elements of the DEA.8
Additional difficulty in tracing Naess’s meanings may result from his philosoph-
ical commitment to vagueness as a tool for encouraging widespread acceptance
of the DEA.9 ”Methodological vagueness” is a sophisticated semantic device for
facilitating the acceptance and agreement of statements and notions by empha-
sizing the positive aspect of ambiguity that is sometimes associated with a high
level of generalization. Naess maintains that this device, by leaving open issues
of an inconsequential nature, acts to facilitate communication and agreement on
the consequential ones. One can readily appreciate the pragmatic merits of e-
liminating irrelevant and contentious details. However, one cannot help but also
wonder if in the process of practical decision-making relevant, but contentious
details might be glossed over.
While Naess’s sincerity, depth of intention, and intellectual integrity are beyond
question, the propriety of emphasizing methodological vagueness raises some
concern. Methodological vagueness has a antipodal side. As Naess himself has
recognized, it can be employed to obfuscate conflicts as with discussions that fail
to point out the oxymoronic nature of the term ”sustainable development.”10
As high level goals, sustainability and development (in the sense of access to
health care, food, shelter, clean water, education, and free nature, etc.) are ad-
mirable and certainly worthy of advocating, but coupled they tend to belie links
to neoclassical welfare economics and the underlying conflicts between ecological
sustainability and perpetual economic growth. Because the border separating
issues of a consequential and an inconsequential nature is amorphous and sub-
jective, as well as quite wide, the use of methodological vagueness can introduce
a tension between parallel efforts designed to isolate and clarify fundamental
conflicts (deep questioning). There is a tradeoff between the benefits associated
with positive expressions of ambiguity and the costs associated with its capacity
for exploitation or potential for generating further confusion.
Failing to directly address ”border” issues, like whether or not privileged onto-
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logical perceptions of nature exist, may only beg further speculation, confusion,
and misconception. In order to fully reap the benefits of methodological vague-
ness, readers must be made aware that it has been employed both with deliber-
ation and without attempt to obfuscate. The end result, otherwise, may be to
turn away some possible supporters who eschew vagueness or, worse yet, wonder
if the technique is being employed to avoid the asperities of deeper analyses.
Also central to the DEA, is Naess’s emphasis and insistence on radical pluralis-
m. Naess, convinced that a successful response to the ecological crisis demands
a diversity of perspectives, approaches and lifestyles, imposes a minimum of ex-
ternal constraints while encouraging individuals to develop their own, critically
thought-out total views. By offering little guidance as to whether acceptance or
rejection of particular norms or hypotheses is mandatory, this approach, how-
ever, also tends to stimulate further confusion over, and criticism of, the DEA.
This leads some to believe that Naess makes it unnecessarily difficult for his
readers to piece together a coherent picture of the DEA. Questions arising from
the use of methodological vagueness and the insistence upon radical pluralism
are bound to generate frustration; they are an inevitable consequence of efforts
to comprehend Naess’s writings. Multiple readings of Naess’s full range of work
are necessary to absorb the depth and complexity of his contribution to envi-
ronmental thought and policy. Readers will, however, be well rewarded for their
journey.
Presentations of the DEA as a systematic philosophical framework for support-
ing the development of ecologically inspired total views (as I attempt to do
below) have been largely absent from other supporter’s discussions of deep ecol-
ogy.12 The DEA is Naess’s theoretical-philosophical approach for encouraging
and assisting individuals to develop ecologically responsible policies, lifestyles,
and concrete decisions.13 The ontologically inspired DEA focuses upon eliminat-
ing the perception of fundamental human/environment and spiritual/physical
cleavages.14 It weaves descriptive and prescriptive premises into a normative
framework for melding a value system with a world view. A primary goal is
to contribute towards ending the ecological crisis by helping individuals avoid
pseudo-rational thinking.
The DEA should be viewed as a Gestalt where not only is the whole more than
the sum of its parts, but the parts, as entities themselves, are more then mere
parts. I take there to be six essential, concatenated elements of the DEA: (1) the
unifying notion of total views, (2) the DEA as a normative-derivational system,
the reasoning devices, (3) ”deep questioning” and (4) ”loose derivation,” (5)
the adoption of ultimate premises that incorporate ”wide identification,” and
(6) the eight points of the deep ecology platform.
Naess argues that humans act as if we have systematic conceptual structures for
relating to the world, total views, which integrate ”our basic assumptions, our
life philosophy, and our decisions in everyday life,”15 whether or not we attempt
to make such structures explicit. Contending that each individual’s decisions
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regarding society and nature are guided by total views, Naess asserts that we
should strive to clearly articulate them. While the process of articulating one’s
total view places significant demands upon the individual, Naess argues, that
we have no choice: ”The essential idea is that, as humans, we are responsible
in our actions as to motivations and premises relative to any question that can
be asked of us.”16 The primary purpose of the DEA is to support individuals
in carrying out this responsibility.
Naess characterizes the DEA as a normative-derivational system. The system-
atization of the DEA is normative because it calls for a particular set of pre-
scriptive ultimate premises. The approach is derivational by virtue of being
a logical systematization, where concrete consequences ”follow” from premises
and hypotheses. Naess’s systematization is not derivational in the traditional
hypothetico-deductive sense, but derivational only in his sense of being predi-
cated upon an identifiable reasoning process.
The description of the DEA as a normative-derivational system is a pedagog-
ical device for elucidating Naess’s process of systematically reasoning from ul-
timate premises to concrete consequences. The approach employs two tools.
”Loose derivation” is the process of building successively more particular norm-
hypothesis chains by working consistently from general norms and hypotheses.
It is ”loose” in the sense that more precise norm and hypothesis statements do
not follow directly from ultimate premises; they also depend upon the character
of the additional, successively more precise norms and hypotheses. The inverse
process, ”deep questioning,” allows norm conflicts to be examined. It acts as a
sort of touchstone to insure that derived consequences are consistent with each
higher level norm and hypothesis. New information and insights may, at times,
warrant the revision of preceding norms and premises.
The DEA rests upon the assumption that certain, very basic premises are un-
proven or unprovable; the deep questioning process must eventually stop. Ulti-
mate premises or ultimate norms are the unavoidable foundations upon which
all theories or generalizations are built. Because of their generality, complexity,
and inherent lack of preciseness, an almost infinite variety of ultimate premises
exist. Naess argues that a wide variety of them are consistent with the DEA.17
As I understand Naess, the only restriction placed upon the set of ultimate
premises to insure that they are deep ecological ultimate premises is that the
Deep Ecology platform (DEP) (see pp. 143-144, Ed.) be derivable from them.18
I use Naess’s term, wide identification, to refer to this common element of deep
ecological ultimate premises. It represents, at a minimum, an expansion of one’s
sphere of concern to include non-humans. It is characterized by the perception
that all life is interdependent; common goals bind all living beings to the life
process. In its most expansive form, wide-identification is the perception that
the interests of all entities in nature (both living and non-living, ecosystems and
individuals) are our own. While Naess may, in his own personal ecosophy, prefer
this most expansive notion of identification, such a wide-reaching perspective is
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by no means necessary for acceptance of the DEP.
The DEP, which summarizes over ten years of thinking about deep ecology, was
worked out and agreed upon by Arne Naess and George Sessions in 1984.19 It
was intended to express ”the most general and basic views” that supporters of
the deep ecology movement (DEM) have in common.20 Naess points out that
the DEP was not supposed to indicate common views in concrete situations.21
On the level of symbolizing a ”call for ecological sustainability” the platform
statements do represent the general views held by supporters of the DEM. On
another level, however, the platform is in some sense, a skeleton outline of a
total view and thus represents more than basic and general views. By outlining
value priorities and calling for operational constraints on human behavior, the
DEP acts as a filter, affecting the derivation process at all levels.
Elements two through five refer to the general process of reasoning from funda-
mentals to form total views. The DEP, as a synthetic product of this reasoning
process, should be distinguished from it. It should be viewed as a precisation
that helps to fill out the DEA by being a tentative set of guidelines for approach-
ing the derivation of ecologically responsible concrete consequences. Individuals
must scrutinize the DEP with the same deep questioning attitude that they
would use to analyze other normative systematizations.
Figure 1 outlines the general process of reasoning from fundamentals to arrive
at concrete consequences, a primary element of the DEA. It explicitly leaves
out the DEP because it represents a particular collection of norms and hypoth-
esis obtained by engaging in the process. For, a priori acceptance of the DEP
violates the aim of the DEA; that is, it presupposes the existence of, and ac-
tive engagement in, a similar process. What I am claiming is that the DEP
should be distinguished from the reasoning process itself. It must be put forth,
and seen, as a precisation that helps to fill out the DEA by being a tentative
set of guidelines for approaching the derivation of ecologically responsible con-
crete consequences. Individuals should scrutinize the DEP with the same deep
questioning attitude that they would use to analyze any other any collections
of norms and premises. One goal of the DEA, after all, is to help individuals
develop their own deep ecological total views.
Figure 1: Process Diagram of the DEA
I have deliberately not included Naess’s four-level systematization22 in the pro-
cess schema because the distinctions between levels 2 and 3, general principles
and more or less general consequences derived from the DEP (i.e., lifestyles),
are fuzzy. As a result, to indicate this fuzziness, general principles and lifestyles
are depicted as particular hypotheses and derived norms that are bracketed off
within the dotted lines and the two clear boundaries, ultimate premises (our
starting point) and concrete consequences (our goals). Even though the fuzzy
distinction between general principles and lifestyles cannot be resolved, lucid
articulation of derivation lines must, nevertheless, be maintained. The crucial
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point is that norms and hypotheses must be articulated so that complete lines
of derivation are readily discernible.
The process figure also draws attention to two crucial procedures for developing
a total view; loose derivation and deep questioning. Figure 1 is intended to
show how the two procedures work in unison, enabling individuals to arrive at a
variety of concrete rules and decisions that maintain consistency with ultimate
premises. As has been mentioned before, a manifold of concrete consequences
can follow from this built-in pluralism. The attraction of Naess’s derivational
structure is that it affords a substantial degree of flexibility. Such a perspective
is compatible with a variety of, sometimes dissonant, ultimate norms, including
those inspired by Christian stewardship, ecofeminism, creation myths, enlight-
ened self-interest, Buddhism, Hinduism, scientific ecology, ecological integri-
ty, social ecology, Taylor’s ”Respect for Nature,”23 biospherical egalitarianism
in principle, Wilson’s Biophilia Hypothesis,24 and Naess’s ”Self-realization!”25
to name a few. It allows individuals to both maintain divergent fundamental
premises and arrive at their own conclusions while still maintaining consistency
with the goal of ecological harmony.
In closing, Naess reminds us that ”we need to integrate life theory and life
practice, clarify our value priorities, distinguish life quality from mere standard
of life, and contribute in our own way to diminish unsustainability.”26 This
quotation marries Naess’s eudaemonic concern with his zetetic sceptic’s response
to the inherent vagueness of the sustainability notion. Here is where the logic
of the DEA shines; society may never agree upon a satisfactory definition of
”sustainability,” but clear cases of unsustainability can be observed. These
should be sought out and redressed while inquiry directed towards clarifying
and elaborating the sustainability notion continues. The DEA is strongest on
justification for a precautionary principle strategy that argues, in the face of
ignorance and uncertainty, to preserve the existing heritage and thereby not
foreclose options. It runs into some difficulty, however, in the area of how
to inculcate wide-identification, and how to inspire value priorities that insure
environmental protection in the face of conflicting choices and opportunities.
The DEA’s focus upon praxis (individual responsibility and action) separate it
from more traditionally descriptive inquiries into ecophilosophy.27 The signifi-
cance of the DEA rests on its concern for practical decision-making; not in the
correctness of the approach, but in its ability to help structure and focus our
thinking about decision-making. Naess’s DEA has provided inspiration and a
secure philosophical foundation for environmental protection, much work awaits
us!
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